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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FEDERAL LEASING, INC. and 
LEWIS W. BUTCHER, 
Plaintiff and Third-
Party Defendants -
Appellants, 
v. 
EADAC, ERNEST C. PSARRAS and 
ANGELA PSARRAS, 
Plaintiff and Third-
Party Defendants -
Appellee. 
Case No, 940329-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the 
District Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended 1994) and transfer from the Utah Supreme Court to 
this Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended 1994). Transfer was designated to the above court by-
notice of May 2 6, 1994. Addendum p. 7. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues 
affecting rights between parties, who, in the pleadings in the law 
suit, were not adverse, where the issues presented for review had 
not been raised either by amendment or consent? This issue was 
1 
directed to the attention of the court both by objection to the 
initial orders signed by the lower court on December 27 and 29, 
1993, respectively (R-3265-3269) , and by argument of counsel at 
hearings held before the Honorable Michael K. Burton on December 
23, 1993 (T-3-7; 20-24) and on January 14, 1994 (T-60-100 and 
specifically 65-70; 73-75; 98-99). 
Whether the trial court had the right to hear the issues, not 
raised in the pleadings, by amendment or consent, is to be 
determined on the question of the correctness of law and no 
deference to the court below is required. Sanderson v. First 
Security Leasing Co. , 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992); Burns Chiropractic 
Clinic v. All State Insurance Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1993) . 
2 . Were certain of the findings and conclusions in the Second 
Amended Order, as the same may affect the rights of appellants in 
claims against appellants and as objected to by appellants, 
supported by substantial and competent evidence? This issue was 
preserved in the record by the written objection of counsel and 
arguments made to the court as set forth in paragraph 1 above. 
Whether the court below erred in entering findings and 
conclusions affecting rights of appellants based on a judgment that 
had not addressed the issues sought to be established by the lower 
court and that were contrary to the effect of rejection of an 
executory contract and dismissal of a case under bankruptcy law is 
a question of both fact and law. The standard for review as to 
questions of law is the correctness of law and no deference to the 
court below is required. Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 
2 
supra and Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. All State Insurance Company, 
supra. As to the standard for review of findings of fact the 
standard is to determine that the findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Stauth v. Brown, 734 P. 2d 1063 
(Kan. 1987). 
3. Did the court err in entering its Second Amended Order, 
dismissing the lawsuit below, on terms and conditions to which 
appellants, parties to the litigation, had objected, especially, 
when appellants had agreed to dismissal of the case with prejudice. 
This issue was preserved in the objection to the orders entered by 
the court on December 27, 1993 and December 29, 1993, respectively 
(R-3265-3269) , and the hearing held on January 14, 1994 (R-52-101; 
specifically see R-75). 
Whether the court below erred in allowing dismissal of the 
case under terms to which appellants had objected is a question of 
law and no deference to the court below is required. Sanderson v. 
First Security Leasing Co. , supra; Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. All 
State Insurance Co., supra. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
See Addendum 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case 
The case below involved an action by the plaintiffs, Federal 
Leasing Inc. and EADAC, a partnership, to recover for the benefit 
of EADAC, Ernest C. and Angela Psarras certain properties that the 
latter at a previous time had assigned to the control of defendant, 
3 
Manifest Liquidating Trust, in which other defendants participated 
as trustees to the trust or managed the properties. R-0002-0053. 
Involvement of Federal Leasing and Wendell Lewis Butcher resulted 
from a certain agreement entered between Federal Leasing and 
Butcher (appellants herein) and EADAC, Ernest C. Psarras, Angela 
Psarras (appellees herein) and Manivest Corporation dated April 22, 
1991. R-3316-3327. The agreement contemplated joint action by 
appellants and appellees against the defendants and appellants were 
to manage, develop and sell certain properties claimed to be owned 
by EADAC and the Psarrases. Id. This agreement is referred to 
herein as Joint Venture Agreement or The Agreement. 
A complaint was filed near May 20, 1991 by Federal Leasing and 
EADAC against defendants (R-0002) with a subsequent counterclaim, 
crossclaims and third party complaints being entered joining 
Wendell Lewis Butcher and the Psarrases, as well as others into the 
action. R-1157-0207. During the process of extensive litigation 
in the instant case differences between the interests of appellants 
and appellees under The Agreement arose. R-33 8 7 para. 5. In a 
suit in Dallas, Texas, between appellants and appellees a judgment 
was rendered declaring that appellants had no interest in certain 
real property of appellees (The Kingsley Park Apartments mentioned 
in the Joint Venture Agreement). R-3329-3331. Further, in a 
bankruptcy proceeding in the Central District of Utah, involving 
appellants as debtors (subsequently dismissed), an order, based on 
stipulation, rejecting The Agreement was entered. R-3337-3338 
and 3349. 
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The controversies, as described, between appellants and 
appellees were not made a part of the instant litigation. However, 
on December 23, 1993 appellees, by motion, sought to settle the 
proceedings with the defendants. R-3222-3233. With the motion for 
settlement, appellees, for the first time, also sought to have the 
lower court, based on the proceedings outside the lawsuit, declare 
any rights of the appellants under The Agreement barred. R-3223-
3233. 
In proceedings before the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Third 
Circuit Court Judge [sitting by assignment from the Third District 
Court (R-2483)] the court, entered two separate orders dismissing 
the case. R-3239-3244; 3253-3258. These orders contained 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which appellants feel 
substantively affect rights they claim against appellees, EADAC, 
Ernest and Angela Psarras and Manivest Corporation, under The Joint 
Venture Agreement of April 22, 1991. 
To protect the rights of appellants and to preclude a future 
determination that rights sought to be protected have been lost, 
this appeal is brought. 
(b) Course of Proceedings 
Counsel for appellees, on December 22, 1993 filed a motion 
seeking to approve settlement between appellees and the defendants 
and a declaration that appellants be barred "... from any further 
litigation of claims against any and all of the Settling Parties," 
including the appellees. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Approval of Settlement and Entry of Bar Order. R-3225 at 3230. 
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Counsel asserted that a rejection order issued by the bankruptcy 
court in the cases of Federal and Butcher terminated the agreement 
of April 22, 1991 and rendered the same void. Id. at 3226-3227. 
Further, counsel alleged that a certain summary judgment decision 
from a court in Dallas, Texas adjudicating that appellants had no 
rights in certain property claimed by appellees (called herein "The 
Kingsley Property" in Dallas, Texas and mentioned in the 22nd of 
April Agreement), that appellants were thereby estopped from 
asserting any rights under the agreement, including any rights to 
any properties under the agreement. Id. at 3229-3330. 
The motion was filed with the court on December 22, 1993 at 
4:50 p.m. with hearing thereon set for the following morning at 
10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Michael K. Burton. R-3222. 
Certificate of service to listed counsel for appellants in the 
instant case, David O. Black, was hand delivered on December 22, 
1993. R-3232-3233. Also, the bankruptcy proceedings of Federal 
and Butcher had been ordered dismissed on December 22, 1993, by the 
Honorable Glen E. Clark. T-53. However, a written order 
dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding was not signed until January 
18, 1994. Addendum p. 99. 
Mr. David Day of the firm of Day and Barney appeared at the 
hearing the next morning (December 23, 1993) on behalf of 
appellants, having received word from Mr. Butcher concerning the 
hearing but a few minutes before. T-3. Mr. David O. Black did 
not appear. Mr. Day objected to the proceedings as they might 
affect rights of appellants. T-20-21. After considerable argument, 
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the court directed that a response be filed by appellants by the 
following Monday, December 27, 1993. R-50. 
Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, who, at that time was of counsel with 
Day & Barney (T-18), negotiated with other counsel for an 
acceptable dismissal order, and believing that such had been 
arranged did not file any response. T-63. However, the court 
entered an order on December 27, 1993 and again on December 29, 
1993. Counsel for appellants believed these orders impaired rights 
of the appellants and were inconsistent with what Mr. Tycksen 
understood had been arranged to resolve the objections of 
appellants. R-3265-3269; T-63-65. Therefore, acting in 
appellants' interest, Mr. Steven C. Tycksen filed an objection to 
the order and sought to have the same altered. R-3265. Additional 
affidavits of other counsel regarding the discussions alleged to 
have taken place by counsel between December 23, 1993 and the 27th 
of the same month were filed and the matter was set for hearing on 
the 14th of January, 1994. 
At the hearing on the 14th of January Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, 
on behalf of appellants advised the court that the orders as 
entered were inconsistent with the discussions he held with counsel 
(T-63-65) , that certain of the findings and conclusions in the 
signed order were outside the issues in the lawsuit and remedies 
sought by appellants had not properly been noticed (T-67-69; 73-74) 
and that dismissal with a bar against parties to the lawsuit 
involving issues in the pending litigation would be acceptable to 
appellants but certain of the findings and conclusions would not be 
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acceptable as they created a cloud on the claims of the appellants 
against the appellees as to matters outside the suit. R-75; 82-83. 
In response, counsel for the appellees, Mr. Doug Parry, 
advised the court he believed the appellants would retain right of 
action against appellees under the agreement between them, 
notwithstanding the order as entered on December 27, 1993. T-97-
98. 
At the conclusion of the proceeding the judge invited the 
parties to attempt to work out an acceptable adjustment to the 
order or to submit alternative proposed orders. R-99. 
Appellants' counsel submitted proposed findings and 
conclusions and order on January 19, 1994. R-3365-3369. 
Mr. Parry submitted a proposed Second Amended Order on or near 
January 19, 1994. R-3304. 
(c) Disposition in the Trial Court 
On March 4, 19 94, the Honorable Michael K. Burton executed the 
Second Amended Order, as submitted by counsel for appellees (R-
3386-3391) . However, the honorable judge elected to make one 
delineation in the decree portion of the Order, namely paragraph 3. 
R-33 91. This paragraph as submitted, and deleted had read: 
3. Butcher and Federal Leasing and their heirs, assigns 
predecessors, and successors in interests (sic) are barred 
from asserting against any party to this lawsuit any right or 
claim contained in the pleadings of this lawsuit. 
(d) Statement of Relevant Facts. 
In the complaint filed in the instant case it is alleged that 
Mr. Ernest Psarras developed certain investments for himself and 
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others which were unfavorably affected by the tax laws of 1986. 
R-0003 . 
By 1988 certain investors in partnerships formed by Mr. 
Psarras desired to be cashed out. Mr. Psarras and certain of the 
defendants, therefore, formed Manivest Liquidating Trust and 
transferred thereto certain of his assets as well as the assets of 
EADAC, a family partnership, to aid in the liquidation of the 
interests of the various investors. R-0003-0004. An agreement 
reciting the terms and obligations of the parties thereto was 
executed on or near April 28, 1988, called the Manivest Liquidating 
Agreement. R-0044. Subsequently, Mr. Psarras and the family 
partnership, EADAC, felt that the members of the trust agreement 
were not properly managing properties transferred, all to the 
detriment of Mr. Psarras and EADAC. R-0003 et. seq. Complaint of 
Plaintiff. 
In an effort to try and preserve such interest as Ernest 
Psarras, his wife, Angela, and EADAC might have, as related to the 
Manivest Liquidating Trust, an agreement (The Agreement) was 
entered between EADAC, Ernest Psarras, Angela Psarras, and Manivest 
Corporation, with Federal Leasing, Inc., a Utah corporation and 
Lewis Butcher on April 22, 1991. R-3316-3327. The essence of the 
Agreement was for Federal Leasing, Inc., and EADAC, collectively to 
proceed against the Manivest Liquidating Trust and others in an 
effort to try and recover certain properties as transferred to 
Manivest Liquidating Trust, and for Federal Leasing or Mr. Butcher 
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to manage, maintain, and liquidate the properties in lieu of 
Manivest Liquidating Trust. Id. 
Attached to the Agreement of April 22, 19 91, was an Exhibit 
'A' (R-3321) which identified by name, and not by legal 
description, properties claimed to be owned by Mr. Psarras or 
EADAC, which properties were to be a part of the Agreement. R-
3218-3221. Included in the scheduled properties was the "Kingsley 
Park Apartments" (Dallas, TX), unit 276. R-3323. 
By virtue of the April 22, 1991 Agreement, the instant 
litigation was commenced on or near May 20, 1991, with the rights 
of Federal Leasing, "...to marshall whatever assets are left to 
manage and to effect meaningful sales of the same." R-0006. 
Defendants responded by answer, counterclaims and third-party 
complaints, which brought Mr. Wendell Butcher, Ernest and Angela 
Psarras into the litigation. R-0157-0207. The case was 
subsequently transferred to the Honorable Michael K. Burton, Third 
Circuit Court Judge, Murray Department, Salt Lake County, Utah. R-
2483. 
Pleadings filed in the case are numerous and directed at 
achieving relief by way of motion for summary judgment and orders 
for compliance with court rulings; however, pleadings filed in this 
case prior December 22, 1993, are not relevant to the issues raised 
in this appeal, except to the extent that the issues now before the 
appellate court were first brought to the attention of the trial 
court, not by way of amended pleadings, but by way of motion to 
allow settlement. R-3223-3224. Pleadings filed on or after the 
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December 22, 1993, raised issues between appellants and appellees 
not previously raised, and then the same were raised for the 
purpose of obtaining settlement between appellants and defendants 
and barring appellants from any claims they might have against 
appellees under The Joint Venture Agreement. Id. and subsequent 
pleadings. 
Following commencement of the above action differences between 
Federal Leasing, Wendell Butcher (appellants) and EADAC, Angela and 
Ernest Psarras (appellees) arose concerning rights of appellants in 
the Kingsley Park Apartments in Dallas, Texas. R-3208. Suit was 
instituted by appellees against appellants in the district court, 
Dallas, Texas challenging appellants' claim of interest in the 
Kingsley property. R-3329. On June 1, 1992, Mr. Lewis Butcher on 
behalf of Federal Leasing Corporation filed a notice of interest in 
real property on the Kingsley Park Apartments in Dallas, Texas. 
R-3202. The suit initiated by EADAC Investment Company, Angela M. 
Psarras and Ernest C. Psarras against Carnicero Dynasty 
Corporation, Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis Butcher was 
subsequently resolved by a final summary judgment on the 2 5th of 
March 1993, the Honorable Lynn Skipworth, judge presiding. R-3194-
3196. 
In the final summary judgment ruling dated May 25, 1993, the 
district court judge, made the following ruling, as pertinent to 
this case: 
The April 22, 1991, agreement between plaintiffs, EADAC 
Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest C. 
Psarras, and defendants, Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis 
Butcher (the "Agreement") , a copy of which is attached to 
11 
this order as Exhibit 'A' , is executory in nature and 
defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal 
Leasing, Inc., and Lewis Butcher, have no rights, legal 
or equitable to the following described real property 
situated in Dallas County, Texas: (Emphasis Added) R-
3329. 
The legal description of the property is then given. The 
Texas court determined that a notice of interest filed by Federal 
Leasing did not create an interest in the property in any of the 
defendants and because The Agreement (April 22, 1991) failed to 
identify the property in issue with reasonable certainty it was 
unenforceable as failing to satisfy the requirements of the Statute 
of Frauds. R-3330. The matter before the Texas court involved 
only the Kingsley property. R-3329-3331. 
Following the entry of the decree from the district court in 
Dallas, Texas, Federal Leasing Corporation on March 29, 1993, and 
Wendell Lewis Butcher, on April 7, 1993, respectively, filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11. R-3333-3335. During the course of 
appellants' bankruptcy litigation between Psarrases, EADAC and the 
other defendants continued. 
Near July 26, 1993, Psarrases filed in the bankruptcy court a 
motion to compel appellants to assume or reject as an executory 
contract The Joint Venture Agreement. R-3337. Prior to the date 
of hearing Federal Leasing Corporation and Wendell Butcher entered 
into a stipulation for rejection, dated November 10, 1993, with 
counsel for the Psarrases acknowledging "... that each party 
asserts that the other party has defaulted and breached the terms 
of the agreement, and that such alleged defaults and breaches make 
it impossible for Butcher to assume the agreement under 11 USC 
12 
Section 365." See R-3337. An order was entered by the Honorable 
Glen E. Clark, pursuant to the stipulation on November 22, 1993, 
rejecting the agreement of April 22, 1991. R-3349-3350. 
At or near the time of the rejection of The Agreement, 
appellants negotiated a proposed settlement agreement with the 
defendants in the instant case. Mr. Douglas Parry, attorney for 
appellants, on December 22, 1993, at 4:50 p.m. (R-3223) filed a 
motion for approval of settlement and entry of bar order. A notice 
of hearing was also filed at the same time scheduling a hearing for 
the following morning, namely December 23, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. R-
3222. 
In support of the motion for settlement and bar against 
Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis W. Butcher, counsel argued: (1) 
that the rejection of the agreement in the bankruptcy proceeding 
constituted a breach and termination of the agreement (R-3227); (2) 
that failure of performance on the part of Butcher and Federal 
Leasing was found by the Texas court (R-3228) and (3) that under 
the ruling of the Texas court, because appellants had no rights 
under The Agreement with respect to the Kingsley Property, they 
also had no rights in The Agreement. R-3229-3230. 
Though the notice certified hand delivery to Mr. David O. 
Black, listed as counsel for plaintiffs, on December 22, 1993 (R-
3232-3233) , Mr. Black did not appear; rather, Mr. David Day, at 
request of Mr. Butcher appeared on the morning of the 23rd. T-5. 
Mr. Black attempted to withdraw as of December 22, 1993. R-3259-
3261. At the hearing on December 23, 1993, Mr. Day of the firm of 
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Day & Barney, advised the court that he had received a call from 
Mr. Butcher concerning the hearing after Butcher received notice 
from Mr. David Black concerning the matter only moments before the 
hearing. T-5-6. Mr. Day objected to inadequate notice (T-6) and 
requested opportunity to make a response by the following Monday. 
The court granted until noon on the following Monday in which to 
respond in writing. T-49-50. 
Between the date of the 23rd of December and the following 
Monday, certain conversations were held between counsel for the 
parties, including Mr. Steven C. Tycksen, who had assisted Federal 
Leasing in its bankruptcy. T-55. Mr. Tycksen understood that the 
case would be settled between appellees and defendants and the 
rights of appellants against appellees would be reserved. T-60-63. 
Because Mr. Tycksen felt the issues concerning appellants had been 
resolved no response was filed. T-63. However, the Honorable 
Michael K. Burton signed an order as presented on December 27, 1993 
which order contained findings and conclusions as proposed by 
appellees' counsel barring rights of appellants, contrary to the 
understanding of Mr. Tycksen. T-63-65. The court then executed an 
order on December 29, 1993, which dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint as amended, defendant's counterclaims as amended and 
third-party complaint's with prejudice. R-3251. On the same date 
the court also executed an amended order which, with minor 
modifications in language and some phraseology, in essence covered 
the same matters as the order signed December 27, 1993. R-3253-
3258. 
14 
On January 6, 1994, on behalf of Federal Leasing, Inc., and 
Lewis W. Butcher, Mr. Steven C. Tycksen filed an objection to the 
order and amended order and sought a motion to amend and hearing. 
R-3265. 
Hearing on the motion to amend was held on January 14, 1994, 
before Judge Burton. T-52. Mr. Steven C. Tycksen appeared on 
behalf of Wendell Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing. Mr. Moxley 
appeared on behalf of the settling defendants, and Mr. Douglas 
Parry appeared on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Psarras and EADAC. T-52 
et. seq. 
Mr. Tycksen advised the court that his clients did not object 
to the conclusion of the lawsuit as to all parties (T-62) ; that 
given discussions held between himself and other counsel he did not 
follow-up in writing to the court by the 27th as he was under the 
impression that matters had been properly resolved. T-63. He 
stated he had received a copy of an order signed by the court 
without having had opportunity to approve the same (T-64-65) and 
further indicated that the order exceeded any of the relief sought 
in the suit, as related to appellants, and that it had extraneous 
findings and collateral orders creating confusion as to the rights 
of his clients. T-65. 
Mr. Tycksen suggested that the court had been asked to make 
findings of fact and conclusions which were either incorrect based 
upon the information provided or were outside the parameters of the 
lawsuit. T-68. He indicated that the collateral estoppel question 
raised in the order was never a part of the existing lawsuit and 
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that reasonable notice and opportunity to defendant had not been 
afforded his clients. T-69. He also pointed out that though there 
was no objection to suggesting that the case be terminated, a claim 
that the rights of Mr. Butcher and Federal Leasing in the 
settlement agreement would be ineffective, would be incorrect as 
The Agreement between appellants and appellees provided that 
appellants would obtain one-half of proceeds gained by their 
efforts. T-73-74. 
Mr. Tycksen reminded the court that both parties (appellants 
and appellees) under the rejection stipulation had claimed that the 
other had breached and that issue needed to be determined. T-74. 
He also stated his clients had no objection to the entry of a bar 
with respect to claims of his clients as to issues in the given 
lawsuit, but other decisions were unnecessary and clouded the 
interest of his clients. T-75. Also mentioned was the fact that 
Mr. Tycksen had not been afforded the courtesy, as required by 
rules of practice, to have an opportunity to review the order 
before it was submitted to the court. T-76. 
In counter-argument Mr. Parry, on behalf of the Psarrases and 
EADAC indicated his view that the order (December 27, 1993) 
deprived appellants to any rights in the proposed settlement 
agreement but did not deprive them of the right to assert claims 
against the appellees under The Agreement of April 22, 1991. T-97-
98. 
At the hearing's conclusion the court requested that each side 
submit a proposed order in the event counsel could not come to an 
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agreement. T-99. 
On January 19, 1994, there was filed by appellant's counsel 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law together with an 
order directing settlement of the lawsuit and dismissal with 
prejudice, reserving however, claims, rights, and obligations as 
may exist between Lewis W. Butcher and Federal Leasing, and EADAC, 
Ernest and Angela Psarras. R-3365-3369. 
Mr. Parry submitted to the court a Second Amended Order and a 
Post Hearing Memorandum (R-3305) to which an objection was filed by 
appellant's counsel. R-3371. The Honorable Michael K. Burton 
executed the Second Amended Order on March 4, 1994, striking, 
however, paragraph 3 of the Decree. R-3391. See also (c) 
Disposition in the Trial court, supra. 
The Second Amended Order retained findings of fact and 
conclusions of law objectionable to Butcher and Federal Leasing 
that, in the judgment of appellant's counsel, might impact the 
rights of appellants to make claims against appellees under the 
Joint Venture Agreement. 
From such findings, conclusions and order appellants make this 
appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate issues 
between appellants and appellees asserted in the case at the time 
appellees were seeking settlement and dismissal of the litigation 
where the issues raised had not been raised previously in the suit 
by way of amendment or tried by express or implied consent pursuant 
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to URCP Rule 15(a) and (b) . Further, certain findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered by the court were not based on 
substantial and competent evidence, were contrary to law and 
inconsistent with the actual proceedings held before the court. 
A trial court does not have the right to determine an issue 
which has not been properly raised, even if it has jurisdiction 
over the parties and the power to hear the controversy. Wanless v. 
D. Land Title, 790 P. 2d 568 (Utah App. 1990) . Issues not raised by 
pleadings may be brought into a suit by amendment, after notice and 
hearing, [URCP 15(a)] or where tried by express or implied consent 
[URCP 15(b)] . However, where an issue, not before the court by way 
of amendment, is sought to be raised over objection no amendment 
will be implied and the issue may not be determined. Pacheco v. 
Martinez, 636 P.2 308 (N.M. App. 1981). 
A judgment rendered against a party is not res judicata as to 
matters that were not determined by the court. Todaro v. Gardner, 
285 P. 2d 839 (Utah 1955) . Further, rejection of an executory 
contract in a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute a 
rescission of the agreement and the rights of the parties accrued 
under the agreement to the time of rejection are preserved. In re 
Rudaw\Empirical Software Products Ltd., 83 B.R. 241 (Bkrtcy S.D. 
N.Y. 1988); R and O Elevator Co., Inc. v. Harmon, 93 B.R. 667 (D. 
Minn. 1988) . Also, dismissal of a case in bankruptcy operates to 
reinstate the rights and interests of the debtor and his creditors 
to their status quo ante. In re Lawson, 156 B.R. 43 (9th Cir.BAP 
19 93) . Therefore, findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted 
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by the court based upon proceedings in other courts were contrary 
to law and unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. See 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., supra, Burns Chiropractic 
Clinic v. All State Insurance Company, supra and Stauth v. Brown, 
734 P. 2d 1063 (Kan. 1987) . 
A trial court is not entitled to place upon a party a 
dismissal order which is unacceptable to that party; rather, the 
court must allow the party to proceed with the litigation in lieu 
of dismissal. Powers v. Professional Rodeo Cowboy's Assoc., 832 P. 
2d 1099 at 1104 (Colo. App. 1992). 
Certain of the findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
entered by the lower court, which affect the claims of appellants 
against appellees must be abrogated, as the same constitute a cloud 
upon rights of appellants which have not been given appropriate 
opportunity for review and are based upon incompetent and 
insubstantial evidence. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE 
EVIDENCE OR TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW# OR ENTER AN ORDER RELATING TO RIGHTS AND CLAIMS 
BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE ACTION, WHOSE INTERESTS AND LEGAL 
RIGHTS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS PREVIOUSLY 
EXCEPT AS RAISED BY THE MOTION FOR SETTLEMENT AND BAR 
ORDER• 
Jurisdiction or the right to determine a cause is usually 
divided as jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction 
over the parties. See State v. Bickford, 672 P.2d 607 (Kan. 1983) . 
19 
For jurisdiction over a party, a party must appear before the 
court, generally, or submit to jurisdiction of the court and 
jurisdiction over the subject matter must be within the power of 
the court to hear and determine a cause. Id. at 609. The right of 
a trial court to determine an issue not raised by the pleadings, 
amendment or consent is a question of correctness of law and no 
deference to the court below is required. Sanderson v. First 
Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992); Burns Chiropractic 
Clinic v. All State Insurance Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1993) . 
A court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a 
controversy in order to proceed; without such subject matter 
jurisdiction the court cannot proceed. Burns Chiropractic Clinic 
v. All State Insurance Co., supra. Parties to a proceeding may not 
by acquiescence confer jurisdiction upon a court where jurisdiction 
would otherwise be lacking. A. J. Mackay Co. v. Oakland 
Construction, 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991). Even where the court has 
the parties and subject matter before it, it still has no right to 
try an issue that has not been properly raised before the court. 
See Wanless v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1990) . 
Our court has recognized that a fundamental requisite of due 
process is an opportunity to be fully heard. See Wiscombe v. 
Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987) . Proper notice required 
must be such that is reasonably calculated to afford the informant 
an opportunity to be heard at a proper time and in a proper manner. 
Worrall v. Qgden City Fire Dept. . 616 P. 2d 598 at 601-602 (Utah 
1980) . 
20 
To bring an issue between parties into an action, not 
originally brought before the court, Rule 15(a) URCP allows a party 
to amend a pleading by leave of court, with opportunity for a 
response and hearing. Alternatively, under Rule 15(b) URCP where 
issues are not raised by the pleadings but are tried by express or 
implied consent they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings. Additionally, if new issues are 
sought to be raised at trial over objection of an opposing party 
the court may "... allow the pleadings to be amended ..." if the 
presentation of the merits will be subserved and the court 
determines that the opposing party will not thereby be prejudiced. 
Rule 15(b) URCP. However, where evidence material to an issue is 
not covered by pleadings but is admitted over an objection at trial 
and the pleadings have not been amended no amendment will be 
implied. Pacheco v. Martinez, 636 P.2d 308 (N.M. App. 1981). 
In the Pacheco case, supra, the court determined that the 
office of pleadings is to afford the parties to an action fair 
notice of both the claims and defenses and the grounds upon which 
such exist; the court may not amend sua sponte and such issues so 
attempted are not properly before the court. 
In the Wanless case, supra, the issue plead to the court was 
whether a relationship between parties constituted a partnership. 
On an affirmative ruling by the jury plaintiff then asked the court 
to grant a claim for a percentage of the value of the partnership 
under Rule 15(b) URCP, as an issue tried by express or implied 
consent. On appeal the court determined that it would be improper 
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for the lower court to enter an order relative to valuation where 
the issue of valuation had not been brought into the dispute either 
by express or implied consent or by the pleadings. 
In the instant case, the parties, namely Federal Leasing and 
Lewis Butcher, were before the court, having either brought the 
complaint or having been joined by way of third party action. As 
well, EADAC was a plaintiff and Ernest and Angela Psarras had been 
brought into the action by way of third party complaint. 
Therefore, the parties (appellants and appellees) were before the 
court. 
Likewise, counsel for appellants would acknowledge that the 
district court (and by assignment, the circuit court) would have 
been a proper forum to hear the question of collateral estoppel and 
the effect of the rejection of the executory contract and 
subsequent dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings between the 
parties had there been proper amendment and opportunity for due 
process with respect thereto; that is to say had there been 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. See Worrall v. Ocrden City Fire Department, supra. The 
meaningful manner would have been opportunity to have the issues 
between the parties established with the rights of discovery and 
marshalling of evidence for subsequent adjudication by trial or 
summary judgment. Such was argued but was not afforded. See T-52-
101 arguments of Mr. Tycksen at hearing of January 14, 1994. 
As above indicated, under Rule 15 (b) URCP when issues are not 
raised by the pleadings but are tried by express or implied consent 
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they may be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. But where objection is made to issues not raised by 
the pleadings the court is not permitted to proceed forward as such 
issues would not be properly before the court. See Pacheco v. 
Martinez, supra. 
In the above case, appellants submit that the court was 
without jurisdiction over the subject matter of issues that arose 
post filing of the complaint between Federal Leasing and Butcher 
and it's initial allies, EADAC and Ernest and Angela Psarras. It 
is true that the court, after the issues were raised, did afford 
opportunity for hearing concerning the nature of the final order to 
be entered regarding settlement. However, the issues as between 
the parties had never been raised in the pleadings with opportunity 
for reasonable and meaningful response nor had the issues been 
tried by express or implied consent. As a consequence, the court 
did not have authority to act in the case, either because the court 
was without subject matter jurisdiction as the subject issues had 
not been raised or the issues having been brought to the attention 
of the court were reviewed [not tried under Rule 15(b) URCP] over 
objection and without consent of parties whose interests were to be 
affected namely, Federal Leasing and Lewis W. Butcher. See Pacheco 
v. Martinez, supra, see also Wanless v. D Land Title, supra. 
POINT II 
CERTAIN OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MADE BY THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO ITS ORDER OF MARCH 4, 
1994, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE RULINGS OF THE FOREIGN 
COURTS AND CONTRARY TO LAW, IN THAT: 
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a. The ruling of the Texas Court is not a bar to claims 
between appellants and appellees, except as to the 
controversy concerning the Kingsley property. 
b. The rejection of the Joint Venture Agreement in 
bankruptcy court was not a rescission and rights of the 
parties were in any event reinstated upon dismissal 
c. The combination of the decision of the Texas court and 
the rejection in bankruptcy court did not render the 
Joint Venture Agreement null and void. 
d. The finding that appellant's did not respond to the 
motion of the appellees for a bar order is misleading. 
Introduction. 
The Second Amended Order adopted by the court contains certain 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to which appellants object 
as potentially affecting rights they claim against appellees. They 
break down as follows: 
1. That under the ruling of the Texas court appellants 
are without rights under The Agreement or are estopped to 
assert rights in that they did not perform thereunder 
(Finding no. 6 and Conclusion 1) , The Agreement was null 
and void (Finding No. 11) and appellants had no rights or 
claims against any party to the action arising out of the 
litigation (Conclusion nos. 1, 4 and 5). 
2. That the rejection of the appellants of The Agreement 
in the bankruptcy court terminated the agreement as a 
matter of law. Conclusion no. 2. 
3. That the force of the ruling of the Texas court and 
the bankruptcy court, allowing rejection of The 
Agreement, left appellants without any rights and claims 
under The Agreement or the suit. Finding no. 11. 
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4. That appellants failed to provide any written response 
to the Motion for Bar Order by December 27, 1993. 
Finding no. 12. 
Additionally, Conclusions of Law 5 and 6 suggest that 
appellants were neither entitled to notice of a hearing on the bar 
order nor did they have any rights in a settlement agreement to be 
reached between other parties. Because appellants had short, but 
actual notice and opportunity to respond in limited fashion and, 
further, because appellants had no objection to other parties' 
arranging settlement, these conclusions (5 and 6) are not 
significant to the relief sought by appellants. 
The standard for review as to questions of law is the 
correctness of law and no deference to the court below is required. 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., supra and Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic v. All State Insurance Company, supra. As to 
the standard for review of findings of fact the standard is to 
determine that the findings are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Stauth v. Brown, 734 P. 2d 1063 (Kan. 1987) . 
II. a. The Texas Ruling. 
The only evidence presented to the court with respect to the 
Texas case was a copy of a Final Summary Judgment. R-332 9. 
Finding of Fact 5 of The Second Amended Order indicates: 
Upon contracting to sale the Kingsley Property, a dispute 
arose between Plaintiffs and Butcher/Federal Leasing as to the 
enforceability of the Agreement. As a consequence, EADAC 
filed an action against Federal Leasing and Lewis Butcher in 
the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, Case No. 92-7821-H 
(the "Texas Case"). 
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Finding 6 indicated: 
By means of a Final Summary Judgment, the Texas Court 
granted Plaintiffs declaratory relief, ruling that the 
Agreement was "executory in nature" and that Lewis Butcher and 
Federal Leasing had no rights thereunder due to the fact that 
neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing had performed thereunder." 
Based on the assumption of the validity of these findings, 
Conclusions 1 and 4 of the Second Amended Order were adopted to 
read: 
1. As a result of the Final Summary Judgment rendered in 
the Texas Case, Butcher and Federal Leasing are collaterally 
estopped from asserting against any party to this action any 
rights or claims arising out of the substance of this 
litigation. 
4. Because Butcher and Federal Leasing have no rights 
under the Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this 
lawsuit. 
Though Conclusion 1 speaks of claims "... arising out of the 
substance of this litigation..." (the instant suit) the claims 
involved in the "substance" must likewise include those which 
appellants challenged and sought to preserve, otherwise, appellees 
counsel would not have been so insistent in having the Second 
Amended Order entered, given the opportunity to have settled the 
case without objection of the appellants. R-3305 et. seq. Post 
Hearing Memorandum Re: Amending Order. 
There is no indication in the single document submitted that 
the issue before the Texas court disputed performance under The 
Agreement; nor is there anything in the decree to support the 
finding that Butcher and Federal Leasing had no rights under The 
Agreement due to the fact that neither Butcher nor Federal Leasing 
had performed thereunder. R-3329-3331. 
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The Texas decree, as submitted by counsel, read at paragraph 
(a) as follows: 
The April 22, 1991, agreement between plaintiffs, 
EADAC Investment Company, Angela M. Psarras and Ernest 
Psarras, and defendants, Federal Leasing, Inc., and Lewis 
Butcher (the agreement) a copy of which is attached to 
this order as Exhibit 'A', is executory in nature, and 
defendants, Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, Federal 
Leasing, Inc, and Lewis Butcher have no rights, legal or 
equitable to the following described real property 
situated in Dallas County, Texas. 
The property is then described. 
At paragraph (b) the court further states: 
The Agreement does not provide, by itself or by 
reference to some other existing writing, sufficient data or 
other means by which the Property to be conveyed may be 
identified with reasonable certainty. As a result, the 
Agreement is unenforceable as failing to satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
There is nothing in the decree to establish that it rested 
upon the failure of Lewis Butcher or Federal Leasing to perform The 
Agreement. Further, the decree decided an issue relative to the 
April 22, 1991 Agreement in reference to a certain parcel of ground 
in Dallas County, Texas. Specifically, the court ruled that any 
liens held by Carnicero Dynasty Corporation (a designated 
defendant) from an assignment of Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company 
against the "Property" (Kingsley) were void. R-3330. The decree 
does not indicate that the other properties mentioned in Exhibit A 
to the Agreement were at issue. R-3329-3331. 
The declaration of unenforceability of The Agreement under the 
Texas decision ran to the enforceability of the claims of the 
defendants under The Agreement with respect to the Kingsley Park 
North Apartments and not to other matters. There is nothing in the 
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Texas decree to suggest that the court considered or that an issue 
was raised as to whether defendants had performed services under 
The Agreement or whether they were entitled to compensation for 
services rendered or advances made. A judgment rendered against a 
party will be res judicata as to the issues decided by the court 
but the judgment cannot be res judicata as to matters not 
determined by the court. Todaro v. Gardner, 285 P. 2d. 839 (1955); 
cf. Wanless v. D Land Title, supra. 
As a consequence, Finding 6 and Conclusions 1 and 4 are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence and must be 
removed. See Stauth v. Brown, 734 P. 2d 1063 (Kansas 1987). 
II. b. Rejection and Dismissal in Bankruptcy. 
Finding 8 of the Second Amended Order acknowledges that 
appellants and appellees stipulated to a rejection of The 
Agreement, an executory contract, under bankruptcy law, which 
stipulation was approved by the court and a rejection order 
entered. R-33 88. Appellants' bankruptcy cases, per Finding 9, were 
ordered dismissed from the bench on Monday, December 20, 1993. Id. 
A written order was not entered until January 18 1994. Addendum p. 
99. 
Conclusions 2, 3 and 4 of the Order of Judge Burton were based 
on Findings 8 and 9, which read: 
2. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's rejection of the 
Agreement in the Bankruptcy Court proceeding operated as a 
matter of law to terminate the Agreement. (Emphasis added). 
3. Butcher's and Federal Leasing's claims in this 
lawsuit, if any, are wholly contingent upon the terms of the 
Agreement. 
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4 . Because Butcher and Federal have no rights under the 
Agreement, they likewise have no rights in this lawsuit. (See 
also Conclusion 5) 
The position asserted by counsel for appellees as to the 
effect of rejection of The Agreement in bankruptcy was misleading 
to the court and also inconsistent in law. Also of importance is 
the fact that the bankruptcy case, in which the rejection was 
accomplished, was dismissed within approximately 3 0 days after the 
entry of the order rejecting the contract which rejection occurred 
by stipulation. R-3388 paras. 8 and 9; R-3349. 
Dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding and its effect is defined 
in 11 USC Section 349. The legislative history concerning 
dismissal under 349 (b) states, "The basic purpose of the 
subsection is to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practicable, 
and to restore all property rights to the position in which they 
were found at the commencement of the case." H.R.Rep. No. 595, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 337-338 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 
1978, pp. 5787, 6294; cited in In re Lawson, 156 B.R. 43 (9th 
Cir.BAP 1993) . 
Unless a court otherwise orders, the effect of an order of 
dismissal is to restore the status quo ante as though the 
bankruptcy case had never been brought. In re Lewis & Coulter, 
Inc. , 159 B.R. 188 (Bkrtcy. W.D. PA. 1993) . The effect of 
dismissal according to the court in In re Lewis & Coulter, supra, 
is to undo the bankruptcy case as far as practicable and restore 
all property rights to the position where they were found at the 
commencement of the case. The estate reverts upon dismissal to the 
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debtor and is subject to all encumbrances in existence prior to the 
bankruptcy proceeding. A debtor's property and debts are subject 
to general laws unaffected by bankruptcy law. Id. at 190 - 191. 
Because the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed, the debtors 
would have been restored to their respective positions status quo 
ante, or in other words as existed prior to the bankruptcy, unless 
the court had otherwise ordered or the law otherwise directed. In 
re Lewis & Coulter, supra. That is to say, appellants and 
appellees would have been reinstated to their respective rights, 
claims and defenses against each other as were established before 
filing of bankruptcy as though the case had never been filed. Id. 
at 190. 
Because the bankruptcy dismissal order sets forth no 
conditions of dismissal (Addendum p. 96) one must look at the order 
of rejection to determine what effect it may have upon the debtors 
and their claimants. Neither the order rejecting The Agreement (R-
3349) nor the stipulation on which the order is based (R-3337-3338) 
sets forth any conditions other than The Agreement is rejected. 
Under Section 11 USC 365(g) a rejection of an executory 
contract is treated as a breach and affords the injured party the 
right to file a claim for damages under 11 USC 502(g). Matter of 
Federated Department Stores, Inc., 131 B. R. 808 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 
1991) . Rejection, in a bankruptcy proceeding usually includes a 
contract under which performance remains to be done to some extent 
on both sides. In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 115 B.R. 738 at 743 
(Bkrtcy D. Mass. 1990) . The purpose behind allowing rejection or 
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assumption of an executory contract is to enable a troubled debtor 
to take advantage of a contract that would benefit the estate or 
alternatively would relieve the estate of a burdensome contract by 
rejecting. In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224 at 225 (Bkrtcy. 1984) . 
However, rejection of an executory contract does not undo 
performances by the parties to the contract, either pre-petition or 
post-petition, which have preceded the assumption or rejection. 
Therefore, performance completed by the debtor or by other parties 
pursuant to an agreement in issue are not affected by the debtor's 
rejection. In re Metro Transportation Co., 87 B. R. 338 at 343 
(Bkrtcy. E.D. Pa. 1988) . In other words, rejection of an executory 
contract by a bankrupt debtor does not rescind the contract or the 
obligations found therein; rather the rejection constitutes nothing 
more than a pre-petition breach of contract. Udell v. Standard 
Carpetland USA, Inc., 149 B.R. 908 (N.D. Ind. 1993). 
Termination of a rejected contract that will not be reinstated 
following dismissal involves circumstances where the agreement was 
terminated under bankruptcy law or from actions establishing 
termination during the bankruptcy proceeding. See, e.g. In re BSL 
Operating Corp., 57 B.R. 945 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1986), where debtor 
allowed a lease to be rejected automatically pursuant to 11 USC 
Section 365(d)(4) and after dismissal of the case the debtor, 
lessee, was determined not to have rights to have the lease 
reinstated with dismissal as it was not one of the reinstating 
factors under 349(b) and the rights of the lessor had vested at the 
time of rejection. Likewise, in In re Newton, 64 B.R. 790 (Bkrtcy. 
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CD.111. 1986) debtor, after executing a lien arrangement for 
unplanted crops, filed bankruptcy before planting the crops and 
sold the harvested crop to a third party. The court determined 
that the rights of the third party became vested as part of the 
bankruptcy process and the lending bank would not be reinstated to 
its lien claim position following dismissal. 
In the instant case, rejection of the executory contract was 
executed upon stipulation of the parties which stipulation 
recognized that there were claims of breach by both parties. R-
3337. The rejection of the executory contract had only the effect, 
so long as the case remained in bankruptcy, of terminating any 
further obligation of performance by Federal Leasing and Butcher, 
granted a claim pre-petition to EADAC and Psarrases for breach of 
contract and excused any subsequent performance of the unperformed 
aspects of the agreement on the part of EADAC and Psarrases. See 
In re RudawXEmpirical Software Products Ltd, 83 B.R. 241 at 246 
(Bkrtcy S.D.N.Y. 1988) The rejection did not alter the claims and 
rights of the parties as may have existed prior to the time of 
rejection. See In re Metro Transportation Co., supra. 
In the instant case there was no evidence presented to the 
lower court, nor was any offered to indicate that on rejection the 
contract was rescinded (Udell v. Standard Carpetland USA, Inc., 
supra), or terminated (In re BSL Operating Corp., supra). 
Therefore, the effect of the rejection and subsequent dismissal 
restored the parties to such position as though no bankruptcy case 
had been brought. See In re Lewis & Coulter, Inc., supra. Such 
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rights and claims as Federal Leasing and Lewis Butcher, EADAC, and 
Psarrases may have had with respect to each other prior to 
bankruptcy were restored at the time of dismissal of the bankruptcy 
case. Consequently, since the rejection of The Agreement in the 
bankruptcy proceeding was not a termination (rescission) (Udell v. 
Standard Carpetland USA, Inc., supra) and rights, pre-petition were 
reinstated to appellants and appellees, Conclusions 2-4 (and as 
related, Conclusion 5) are unsupported by competent evidence and 
are inconsistent with law and must be abrogated from the order of 
the lower court. See Stauth v. Brown, supra. 
II. c. The Combination of the Texas and Bankruptcy Rulings. 
Finding no. 11 of the Second Amended Order suggests that given 
both the Texas ruling and the rejection of The Agreement in the 
bankruptcy court The Agreement was "... null and void . . .therefore 
leaving Butcher and Federal Leasing without rights and claims 
thereunder, including all claims set forth in this action." R-
3389. Conclusions 5 and 6 express that as a result of Conclusions 
2-4 (relating to the bankruptcy rejection) and Conclusion 1 (the 
Texas decision) that appellants were neither entitled to notice nor 
were they necessary parties to any settlement agreement. 
Elementary math would suggest, "Quantities equal to the same 
quantities are equal to each other." As set forth in discussion 
II. a. and II. b., above, neither the Texas court ruling nor the 
bankruptcy rejection rendered the Agreement, as between appellants 
and appellees, void or rescinded. Therefore, if neither foreign 
court ruling would extinguish all rights of appellants against 
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appellees how can it be said that the combination of the two would 
do so? Zero plus zero is still zero. 
In argument to the court at the January 14, 19 94, hearing, Mr. 
Parry for appellees argued that the entry of the proposed order 
would not restrict the rights of appellants against appellees. T-
97-98. Nevertheless, in submitting the Second Amended Order 
counsel was careful to leave intact those portions of the order as 
challenged by appellants' counsel and argued for the same. R-3305-
Post Hearing Memorandum. As set forth in appellants' Point II. a. 
and b. there is no basis to sustain any finding or conclusion that 
rights of appellants against appellees were extinguished by either 
or both rulings of the stated courts. 
It is true that the decision in Texas decided that appellants 
had no claim to the real property in issue in that case. However, 
The Agreement provided that appellants would share in the proceeds 
of properties recovered and be reimbursed for expenses. R-3320 
Paras. G and H. Certainly, a finding that appellants had no rights 
in property inadequately described would not preclude a claim for 
expenses and compensation otherwise allowed under The Agreement. 
Likewise, even assuming the bankruptcy rejection of The Agreement 
terminated rights and obligations of the parties, it did not 
prevent a claim for breach by appellees against appellants nor did 
it preclude claims and defenses of appellants accrued as of the 
date of rejection. See In re Metro Transportation Co., supra. 
The finding of the lower court that the rulings of the Texas 
court and bankruptcy court, rejecting the Agreement, rendered the 
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Agreement null and void, leaving appellants without rights and 
claims against appellees, is not supported by reasonable and 
competent evidence. Therefore, the challenged findings and 
conclusions in support of such a position must be stricken. See 
Stauth v. Brown, supra. 
II. d. Appellants Failure to Respond. 
Finding 12 (R-3389) suggests that although appellants at a 
hearing on December 23, 1993 were afforded an opportunity to file 
a written response by noon on Monday, December 27, 1993, none was 
filed. The finding, as written, is correct but is also misleading 
as to the events that transpired. As the finding is approved by 
the court one would assume that the Order was entered by the court 
after opportunity to be heard was given and no response was made. 
In the hearing of January 14, 1994, Mr. Tycksen advised the 
court that he did not file a written response as he felt the matter 
had been resolved by discussions between counsel. T-63. Although 
there was dispute between counsel as to what was agreed, it is 
evident that following the court's entry of the order of the 27th 
and the 29th, respectively, that an objection on behalf of 
appellants was filed to the orders, (R-3265) , a hearing was held 
thereon (T-52) and the judge elected to strike a portion of the 
suggested order based on the hearing. See Second Amended Order 
under Decree paragraph 3, page 6 at R-3391. 
Finding 12 (R-3389) challenged under this subdivision II. d., 
if left to stand, will not affect the rights of appellants as 
against appellees should other findings, as challenged here, be 
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removed. However, the findings should not be allowed to suggest 
that no action was taken by appellants when, in fact, substantial 
effort to prevent the entry of the findings and conclusions was 
made. 
POINT III 
THE PROCEEDINGS SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL FOR EADAC, ERNEST 
AND ANGELA PSARRAS FOR A BAR ORDER WERE NEITHER NECESSARY 
NOR RELEVANT TO A DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BELOW, 
ESPECIALLY UPON REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL LEASING, INC., 
AND WENDELL LEWIS BUTCHER THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO 
A DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. 
By way of communication to opposing counsel (T-62) , by 
pleadings filed (R-3266) and by way of argument of counsel for 
Lewis Butcher and Federal Leasing (T-75), appellants stated they 
had no objection to a dismissal, with prejudice so long as the 
prejudice ran strictly to the issues in the case raised by the 
pleadings before the court and appellants' claims against appellees 
were preserved. 
During the course of argument Mr. Parry, appellees counsel, 
even advised the court that the resolution proposed under the order 
(entered December 27, 1993 and also December 29, 1993) would not 
preclude the rights of Mr. Butcher or Federal Leasing to proceed 
against defendants in other actions. T-97-98. Consequently the 
need for findings of fact and conclusions of law attempting to 
adjudicate rights and claims of Butcher and Federal Leasing, vis a 
vie EADAC and Psarrases under the April 22, 1991 Agreement, was not 
necessary and in fact the case could have been resolved by a mere 
dismissal with prejudice of the action as to all parties. 
Appellants counsel so advised the court. T-75. Appellants did, 
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however, object to any entry of an order relative to any issues 
that had not been properly brought before the court. R-3266 and T-
68; 73. 
Dismissal of a lawsuit not joined by all parties is 
ineffective. Erickson v. One Thirty-Three, Inc. and Associates, 
766 P. 2d. 898, 899 (Nev. 1988). Where a trial court attempts to 
place terms or conditions upon a dismissal order, which are 
unacceptable to a party, the objecting party is then entitled to 
elect to proceed with the litigation. Powers v. Professional Rodeo 
Cowboys' Assoc., 832 P. 2d 1099, 1104 (Colo. App. 1992). 
In the instant case, the terms and conditions of the dismissal 
were objectionable to appellants. The court apparently was 
persuaded by what appellants assert to be insubstantial and 
incompetent evidence that the rights and claims of appellants had 
been terminated and declared invalid in foreign courts. 
As set forth in Point II of appellants' brief the evidence was 
neither substantial nor was it competent, and appellants had 
objected to the dismissal under the terms and conditions. 
If it is true that the appellants had no further rights under 
The Agreement, and that every right and claim of appellants against 
EADAC and Psarrases had been adjudicated either in the Texas court 
or the bankruptcy court or both, then of course the decision of the 
court to allow dismissal without the appellants' challenge would be 
appropriate, provided the appellants had been given due process as 
to the issues raised against them with meaningful notice and 
opportunity for hearing, including discovery. See Wiscombe v. 
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Wiscombe, supra. However, the court not only dismissed the case 
but made findings affecting substantive rights of the appellants 
without the issues having been properly framed and brought before 
the court. See Point I. 
Perhaps the honorable judge in striking paragraph 3 of the 
second Amended Order was of the opinion that he was reserving the 
rights of the appellants. R-3359 (The note, although in the 
record, in not authenticated.) However, the fact remains that he 
left intact those findings and conclusions as previously addressed 
(See Point II) which appear to have decided the effect of the Texas 
and bankruptcy cases on the appellants' rights. 
The court's alternative was to accept the conditions of 
dismissal set forth by the plaintiff, i.e., an unconditional 
dismissal without indication of the effect of any outside 
proceedings upon the dismissal or refuse to grant the dismissal and 
allow the issues raised to be properly presented to the court by 
way of proposed amendment with the protection of rights of 
discovery for due process with opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. See Powers v. 
Professional Rodeo Cowboys' Assoc., supra, Pacheco v. Martinez, 
supra and Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as above stated, appellants respectfully 
request that the above entitled court vacate the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law entered in the court below, or that the 
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court either reinstate the matter to allow the parties, appellants 
and appellees, EADAC, Ernest and Angela Psarras, to amend the 
pleadings and allow issues therein to be raised to be reasonably 
presented, discovery to be had and an adjudication to be made. 
Alternatively, appellants request, that an order be entered 
dismissing the case with prejudice as to the issues that have been 
properly framed and raised in the proceeding below, reserving to 
appellants such rights, claims and defenses as may exist between 
them and appellees. 
Dated this ^ 7 day of October 1994 
J^y IV. /Birney, 
)rniy for Appellants 
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